

**Syllabus for ECS-7015**  
**Ph.D. Development Economics**  
**Fall 2018**

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Office hours: Tuesday 3:30-4:30, Thursday 5:15-6:15, or by appointment

Course schedule: TuTh 2- 3:15  
Course meets: Deuxieme Maison 323

## **1. Course Description and Objectives**

This class is a PhD level course on development economics. The goal of this course is to prepare students for their own work by giving them theoretical and empirical knowledge on microeconomic development and practices in critically reading papers and laying out research ideas. The topics covered include institutions, household models, credits, savings, insurance, education, health, gender, migration, labor markets, and firms. The class will work through a few papers in detail rather than synthesize a literature. Students are expected to have read the articles and be prepared to discuss them in class in depth.

Although the course name is Development Economics *Theory*, the course will put equal, if not more, weight on empirical applications, given the importance of empirical work in the current literature on economic development.

## **2. Prerequisites**

Graduate coursework in economic theory and econometrics is prerequisites for this class.

## **3. Course Requirements**

### **3.1 Participation (10%)**

You are expected to come prepared to discuss and analyze the readings. I will ask you questions about the required readings during class. Also, you should ask questions and share your thoughts.

### **3.2 Homework assignments (42%)**

There will be three homework assignments that combine theoretical and data analysis (14% each). You will need to use Stata or similar statistical software.

### **3.3 Referee reports (38%)**

You will write three referee reports: one referee report on a paper published in a top economics journal; one on a paper presented in an economic development conference; and one on a paper by a job market candidate (10% each). You will give two 25-30 minute presentations of the published paper and the job market paper you referee (4% each).

Each referee report should be no more than 3 pages double-spaced. You should start the report with a one paragraph summary of the main argument of the paper and describe your main 3-4 points in detail. Conclude the report with more minor comments. The purpose of a referee report is to help the editor of a journal if s/he should reject the paper or request revisions (and if so, what revisions to request). A good referee report not only clearly states the shortcomings but also include constructive, detailed and realistic suggestions for improvement.

These assignments will allow you to read and critique papers on the research frontier of development economics and have a concrete sense of the quality of top published work, in-progress work, and work being done by leading Ph.D. candidate in the field.

### 3.4 Research ideas (10%)

You put together two 1-2 page typed research ideas on economic development. It should include 1) a specific research question, 2) theoretical predictions/reasoning (What answer does theory imply?), and 3) empirical strategy (What data and empirical model and equation would you use? What would be an identification issue?). There will be 2 assignments. Research ideas may be briefly discussed in a class, depending on course time constraint.

This assignment is intended to help you build the ability to come up with and frame an academic research idea. You do not need to cite the literature or spend time giving the background of the situation. You are expected to focus on developing your research question by asking yourself why the question is important, how the question can be more important and interesting for both you and academic audience, and how you answer it. You do not need to choose your question based on available data. You can develop a research idea as if you have the ideal data set that would be feasible to collect with time and money.

The grade will be max[the grade of the first research idea, the grade of the second].

### 3.5 Grading

Assignment due dates and point distributions are given below. If you choose not to turn in an assignment on time, you will lose 20% of the total points that you earn on the assignment for each day that it is late.

Assignment	Points	Due date
Participation	10	
Homework 1	14	9/17
Homework 2	14	10/15
Homework 3	14	11/19
Referee reports and presentations	38	Assorted dates
Research ideas	10	9/24, 10/31

Final letter grade will be awarded according to the scale below:

A	$\geq 93$
A-	$< 93 \ \& \ \geq 90$

B+	<90 & >=85
B	<85 & >=80
B-	<80 & >=75
C+	<75 & >=70
C	<70 & >=65
D	<65 & >=60
F	< 60

#### 4. Course Outline and Readings

This schedule is subject to change. I may add or drop readings during the semester. I will announce changes in class and update the syllabus.

Day	Date	Topic	Assignment
1	8/27	Introduction	
2	8/29	Institutions, corruption, conflict	
3	9/3	Institutions, corruption, conflict	
4	9/5	Institutions, corruption, conflict	
5	9/10	Catch-up day	
6	9/12	Household model	
7	9/17	Informal insurance	HW1
8	9/19	Credit	
9	9/24	Credit	Research idea #1
10	9/26	Microfinance	
11	10/1	Microfinance	
12	10/3	Savings	
13	10/8	Transfers	
14	10/10	Presentations of papers referred (3 persons)	Referee report #1
15	10/15	Education	HW2
16	10/17	Education	
17	10/22	Education	
18	10/24	Presentation of papers referred (2 persons)	Referee report #1
19	10/29	Health	
20	10/31	Health	Research idea #2
21	11/5	Gender	
22	11/7	Gender	
23	11/12	Catch-up day	Referee report #2
24	11/14	Migration	
25	11/19	Migration	HW3
26	11/21	Labor and firms	
27	11/26	Labor and firms	
28	12/3	Labor and firms	
29	12/5	Presentations of papers referred (1 persons)	Referee report #3
30	12/12	Presentations of papers referred (4 persons)	Referee report #3

The required readings are marked with an asterisk.

#### 4.1 Introduction

- Banerjee, A. V., & Duflo, E. (2007). "The economic lives of the poor." *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 21(1), 141-168.
- Schultz, T. W. (1980). "Nobel lecture: The economics of being poor." *Journal of Political Economy*, 88(4), 639-651.
- Kraay, A., & McKenzie, D. (2014). "Do poverty traps exist? Assessing the evidence." *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 28(3), 127-48.

#### 4.2 Institutions, corruption and conflict

##### *Institutions*

- \*Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation" *American Economic Review* 91(5): 1369-1401 (2001)
- Albouy, David; "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation: Comment" *AER*, 2012
- Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2002). Reversal of fortune: Geography and institutions in the making of the modern world income distribution. *The Quarterly journal of economics*, 117(4), 1231-1294.
- Acemoglu, D., & Johnson, S. (2005). Unbundling institutions. *Journal of political Economy*, 113(5), 949-995.
- Nunn, N. (2008). "The long-term effects of Africa's slave trades." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(1), 139-176.
- Dell, M. (2010). "The persistent effects of Peru's mining mita." *Econometrica*, 78(6), 1863-1903.
- Michalopoulos, S., & Papaioannou, E. (2013). Precolonial ethnic institutions and contemporary African development. *Econometrica*, 81(1), 113-152.
- Michalopoulos, S., & Papaioannou, E. (2013). National institutions and subnational development in Africa. *The Quarterly journal of economics*, 129(1), 151-213.
- Burgess, R., Jedwab, R., Miguel, E., Morjaria, A., & Padró i Miquel, G. (2015). The value of democracy: evidence from road building in Kenya. *American Economic Review*, 105(6), 1817-51.
- Tabellini, G. (2010). Culture and institutions: economic development in the regions of Europe. *Journal of the European Economic association*, 8(4), 677-716.
- Nunn, Nathan "The Importance of History for Economic Development" *Annual Review of Economics* 1: 65-92 (2009)
- Spolaore, E., & Wacziarg, R. (2013). "How deep are the roots of economic development?" *Journal of Economic Literature*, 51(2), 325-69.

##### *Corruption*

- \* Ferraz, C. & Finan, F. (2008), "Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effect of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 123(2), 703-745.

- Avis, E., Ferraz, C., & Finan, F. (2018). Do government audits reduce corruption? Estimating the impacts of exposing corrupt politicians. *Journal of Political Economy*, 126(5), 1912-1964.
- Reinikka, R., & Svensson, J. (2004). "Local capture: evidence from a central government transfer program in Uganda." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 119(2), 679-705.
- Olken, Ben. (2007), "Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia," *Journal of Political Economy* 115(2), 200-249.
- Gorodnichenko, Y., & Peter, K. S. (2007). Public sector pay and corruption: Measuring bribery from micro data. *Journal of Public economics*, 91(5-6), 963-991.
- Lewis-Faupel, S., Neggers, Y., Olken, B. A., & Pande, R. (2016). Can electronic procurement improve infrastructure provision? Evidence from public works in India and Indonesia. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 8(3), 258-83.
- Olken, Ben and Rohini Pande (2012) "Corruption in Developing Countries", *Annual Review of Economics*, Vol. 4.

### *Conflict*

- Blattman, C. and E. Miguel (2010). "Civil war." *Journal of Economic Literature* 48(1): 3-57.
- Ray, D. and J. Esteban (2017). "Conflict and Development." *Annual Review of Economics* 9: 263-293.
- \* Dell, M., & Querubin, P. (2017). Nation building through foreign intervention: Evidence from discontinuities in military strategies. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 133(2), 701-764.
- Miguel, E. and G. Roland (2011). "The long-run impact of bombing Vietnam." *Journal of Development Economics* 96(1): 1-15.
- Blattman, C. and J. Annan (2010). "The consequences of child soldiering." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 92(4): 882-898.
- Voors, M. J., E. E. M. Nillesen, P. Verwimp, E. H. Bulte, R. Lensink and D. P. V. Soest (2012). "Violent Conflict and Behavior: A Field Experiment in Burundi." *American Economic Review* 102(2): 941-964.
- Callen, M., M. Isaqzadeh, J. D. Long and C. Sprenger (2014). "Violence and Risk Preference: Experimental Evidence from Afghanistan." *American Economic Review* 104(1): 123-148.
- Miguel, E., S. Satyanath and E. Sergenti (2004). "Economic shocks and civil conflict: An instrumental variables approach." *Journal of Political Economy* 112(4): 725-753.
- Bazzi, S., & Blattman, C. (2014). Economic shocks and conflict: Evidence from commodity prices. *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, 6(4), 1-38.
- Yanagizawa-Drott, D. (2014). "Propaganda and conflict: Evidence from the Rwandan genocide." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 129(4): 1947-1994.
- Berman, N., Couttenier, M., Rohner, D., & Thoenig, M. (2017). This mine is mine! How minerals fuel conflicts in Africa. *American Economic Review*, 107(6), 1564-1610.
- Fetzer, T. and S. Marden (2017). "Take what you can: property rights, contestability and conflict." *The Economic Journal* 127(601): 757-783.
- Nunn, N. and N. Qian (2014). "US Food Aid and Civil Conflict." *American Economic Review* 104(6): 1630-1666.

- Clingingsmith, D., Khwaja, A. I., & Kremer, M. (2009). Estimating the impact of the Hajj: religion and tolerance in Islam's global gathering. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 124(3), 1133-1170.
- Blattman, C., Jamison, J. C., & Sheridan, M. (2017). Reducing crime and violence: Experimental evidence from cognitive behavioral therapy in Liberia. *American Economic Review*, 107(4), 1165-1206.
- Blattman, C. and J. Annan (2016). "Can Employment Reduce Lawlessness and Rebellion? A Field Experiment with High-Risk Men in a Fragile State." *American Political Science Review* 110(1): 1-17.

#### **4.3 Household model**

- \* Bardhan and Udry, *Development Microeconomics*, Chapter 2
- Singh, I, L Squire, and J Strauss, eds. (1986). *Agricultural Household Models: Extensions, Applications, and Policy*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- de Janvry, A., Fafchamps, M., & Sadoulet, E. (1991). Peasant Household Behaviour with Missing Markets: Some Paradoxes Explained. *Economic Journal*, 101(409), 1400-417.
- Benjamin, D. (1992). Household composition, labor markets, and labor demand: testing for separation in agricultural household models. *Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society*, 287-322.

#### **4.4 Informal insurance**

- \* Townsend, R. (1994), "Risk and Insurance in Village India," *Econometrica* 62(3), 539-591.
- Udry, C. (1994), "Risk and Insurance in a Rural Credit Market: An Empirical Investigation in Northern Nigeria," *Review of Economic Studies* 61(3), 495-526.
- Udry, Christopher (1990) "Credit Markets in Northern Nigeria: Credit as Insurance in a Rural Economy" *World Bank Economic Review*
- Rosenzweig, M. R., & Stark, O. (1989). Consumption smoothing, migration, and marriage: Evidence from rural India. *Journal of political Economy*, 97(4), 905-926.
- Rosenzweig, M. R., & Binswanger, H. P. (1992). Wealth, weather risk, and the composition and profitability of agricultural investments (Vol. 1055). World Bank Publications.
- Bardhan & Udry, *Development Microeconomics*, Chapter 8.

#### **4.5 Credit**

- \* Bardhan & Udry, *Development Microeconomics*, Chapter 7.
- Stiglitz, J. & A. Weiss (1981), "Credit Rationing in Markets with Incomplete Information," *American Economic Review* 71(3), 393-410.
- \* Karlan, D. & J. Zinman (2009), "Observing Unobservables: Identifying Information Asymmetries with a Consumer Credit Field Experiment," *Econometrica* 77(6), 1993-2008.
- Burgess, R., & Pande, R. (2005). Do rural banks matter? Evidence from the Indian social banking experiment. *American Economic Review*, 95(3), 780-795.

- Karlan, D., & Morduch, J. (2010). Access to finance. In Handbook of development economics (Vol. 5, pp. 4703-4784). Elsevier.

## 4.6 Microfinance

### *Microcredit*

- \* Banerjee, A., Duflo, E., Glennerster, R., & Kinnan, C. (2015). The miracle of microfinance? Evidence from a randomized evaluation. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 7(1), 22-53.
- Pitt, M. & S.R. Khandker (1998), "The Impact of Group-Based Credit Programs on Poor Households in Bangladesh: Does the Gender of Participants Matter," *Journal of Political Economy* 106(5), 958-996.
- Coleman, Brett E. 1999. "The impact of group lending in Northeast Thailand." *Journal of development economics* 60: 105-141.
- Banerjee, A., Karlan, D., & Zinman, J. (2015). Six randomized evaluations of microcredit: Introduction and further steps. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 7(1), 1-21.
- Ghatak, M. (1999). Group lending, local information and peer selection. *Journal of development Economics*, 60(1), 27-50.
- Besley, T., & Coate, S. (1995). Group lending, repayment incentives and social collateral. *Journal of development economics*, 46(1), 1-18.
- Stiglitz, J. E. (1990). Peer monitoring and credit markets. *The world bank economic review*, 4(3), 351-366.
- \* Gine, X. & D. Karlan (2014), "Group versus Individual Liability: Short and Long Term Evidence from Philippine Microcredit Lending Groups," *Journal of Development Economics* 107 65-83
- Field, E., & Pande, R. (2008). Repayment frequency and default in microfinance: evidence from India. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 6(2-3), 501-509.
- Feigenberg, B., E. Field and R. Pande (2013). "The economic returns to social interaction: Experimental evidence from microfinance." *Review of Economic Studies* 80: 1459-1483.
- Karlan, D. S. (2007). Social connections and group banking. *The Economic Journal*, 117(517), F52-F84.
- Field, E., Pande, R., Papp, J., & Rigol, N. (2013). Does the classic microfinance model discourage entrepreneurship among the poor? Experimental evidence from India. *American Economic Review*, 103(6), 2196-2226.
- Giné, X., Goldberg, J., & Yang, D. (2012). Credit market consequences of improved personal identification: Field experimental evidence from Malawi. *American Economic Review*, 102(6), 2923-54.
- Morduch, J. (1999) "The Microfinance Promise," *Journal of Economic Literature* 37(4), 1569-1614.

### *Microinsurance*

- Karlan, D., Osei, R., Osei-Akoto, I., & Udry, C. (2014). Agricultural decisions after relaxing credit and risk constraints. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 129(2), 597-652.

- Cole, S., Giné, X., Tobacman, J., Topalova, P., Townsend, R., & Vickery, J. (2013). Barriers to household risk management: Evidence from India. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 5(1), 104-35.
- Giné, X., & Yang, D. (2009). Insurance, credit, and technology adoption: Field experimental evidence from Malawi. *Journal of Development Economics*, 89(1), 1-11.
- Giné, X., Townsend, R., & Vickery, J. (2007). Patterns of rainfall insurance participation in rural India. The World Bank.
- Janzen, S. A., & Carter, M. R. (2019). After the drought: The impact of microinsurance on consumption smoothing and asset protection. *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*, 101(3), 651-671.
- Mobarak, A. M., & Rosenzweig, M. (2014). Risk, insurance and wages in general equilibrium (No. w19811). National Bureau of Economic Research.

#### 4.7 Savings

- \* Paxson, C. (1992), "Using Weather Variability to Estimate the Response of Savings to Transitory Income in Thailand," *American Economic Review* 82(1), 15-33.
- Deaton, A. (1991). "Saving and Liquidity Constraints," *Econometrica* 59(5), 1221-1248.
- Udry, C. (1995), "Risk and Saving in Northern Nigeria," *American Economic Review* 85(5), 1287-1300.
- Dupas, P., J. Robinson (2013). "Savings Constraints and Microenterprise Development: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Kenya" *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 5(1): 163-192.
- Dupas, P. & J. Robinson (2013), "Why Don't the Poor Save More? Evidence from Health Savings Experiments," *American Economic Review* 103(4): 1138-1171.
- Ashraf, Nava, Dean Karlan, and Wesley Yin. (2006) "Tying Odysseus to the Mast: Evidence from a Commitment Savings Product in the Philippines" *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 121(2): 635-672
- Duflo, E., M. Kremer & J. Robinson (2011), Nudging Farmers to Use Fertilizer: Theory and Experimental Evidence from Kenya," *American Economic Review* 101(6): 2350-2390.

#### 4.8 Transfers

- \* Baird, S., McIntosh, C. & Özler, B. (2011), "Cash or Condition? Evidence from a Cash Transfer Experiment," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 126(4), 1709-1753.
- Alatas, V., Banerjee, A., Hanna, R., Olken, B. A., & Tobias, J. (2012). Targeting the poor: evidence from a field experiment in Indonesia. *American Economic Review*, 102(4), 1206-40.
- Alatas, V., Purnamasari, R., Wai-Poi, M., Banerjee, A., Olken, B. A., & Hanna, R. (2016). Self-targeting: Evidence from a field experiment in Indonesia. *Journal of Political Economy*, 124(2), 371-427.
- Benhassine, N., Devoto, F., Duflo, E., Dupas, P., & Pouliquen, V. (2015). Turning a Shove into a Nudge? A "Labeled Cash Transfer" for Education. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 86-125.



- Hanna, R., & Karlan, D. (2017). Designing Social Protection Programs: Using Theory and Experimentation to Understand how to Help Combat Poverty. In Handbook of Economic Field Experiments (Vol. 2, pp. 515-553). North-Holland.

#### 4.9 Education

- \* Duflo, Esther "Schooling and Labor Market Consequences of School Construction in Indonesia: Evidence from an Unusual Policy Experiment" American Economic Review 91(4): 795-813 (2001)
- Wantchekon, L., Klačnja, M., & Novta, N. (2014). "Education and human capital externalities: Evidence from colonial Benin." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 130(2), 703-757.
- Meghir, C., & Palme, M. (2005). Educational reform, ability, and family background. American Economic Review, 95(1), 414-424.
- \* Jensen, R. (2010). "The (perceived) returns to education and the demand for schooling." Quarterly Journal of Economics 125(2): 515-548.
- Hastings, J., Neilson, C. A., & Zimmerman, S. D. (2015). The effects of earnings disclosure on college enrollment decisions (No. w21300). National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Dizon-Ross, R. (2019). Parents' Beliefs About Their Children's Academic Ability: Implications for Educational Investments. American Economic Review, 109(8), 2728-65.
- Andrabi, T., J. Das and A. I. Khwaja (2017). "Report cards: The impact of providing school and child test scores on educational markets." American Economic Review 107(6): 1535-63.
- \* Duflo, E., Dupas, P., & Kremer, M. (2011). Peer effects, teacher incentives, and the impact of tracking: Evidence from a randomized evaluation in Kenya. American Economic Review, 101(5), 1739-74.
- Muralidharan, Karthik and Venkatesh Sundararaman. (2011). "Teacher Performance Pay: Experimental Evidence from India", Journal of Political Economy, 119(1), 39-77.
- Duflo, E., Hanna, R., & Ryan, S. P. (2012). Incentives work: Getting teachers to come to school. American Economic Review, 102(4), 1241-78.
- Krueger, Alan and Mikael Lindahl (2001) "Education for Growth: Why and For Whom?" Journal of Economic Literature 39(4): 1101-1136
- Glewwe, P. and M. Kremer (2006). "Schools, teachers, and education outcomes in developing countries." Handbook of the Economics of Education 2: 945-1017.
- Kremer and Holla (2009) "Improving Education in the Developing World: What Have We Learned from Randomized Evaluations?" Annual Review of Economics
- Muralidharan, K. (2017). "Field experiments in education in developing countries." In A. V. Banerjee and E. Duflo, Eds. Handbook of Field Experiments: North Holland.

#### 4.10 Health

- Dupas, Pascaline "Health behavior in developing countries" Annual Review of Economics 3: 425-449 (2011)

- Kremer, M. and R. Glennerster (2011). "Improving health in developing countries: evidence from randomized evaluations." In M. V. Pauly, T. G. Mcguire and P. P., Eds. *Handbook of Health Economics*: Elsevier.
- Das, J. and J. Hammer (2014). "Quality of primary care in low-income countries: Facts and economics." *Annual Review of Economics* 6(1): 525-553.
- Dupas, P., & Miguel, E. (2017). Impacts and determinants of health levels in low-income countries. In *Handbook of economic field experiments* (Vol. 2, pp. 3-93). North-Holland.
- \* Miguel, T. & Kremer, M. (2004), "Worms: Identifying Impacts on Education and Health in the Presence of Treatment Externalities," *Econometrica* 72(1), 159-217.
- Baird, Sarah, Joan Hamory Hicks, Michael Kremer, and Edward Miguel. (2016). "Worms at Work: Long-run Impacts of Child Health Gains", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 131(4), 1637-1680.
- \* Das, Jishnu, Alaka Holla, Aakash Mohpal, and Karthik Muralidharan. (2016). "Quality and Accountability in Health Care Delivery: Audit-study Evidence from Primary Care in India", *American Economic Review*, 106(12), 3765-3799.
- Dupas, Pascaline. (2014). "Short-run subsidies and long-run adoption of new health products: Evidence from a field experiment", *Econometrica*, 82(1), 197-228.
- Acemoglu, Daron and Simon Johnson "Disease and Development: The Effect of Life Expectancy on Economic Growth" *Journal of Political Economy* 115(6): 925-985 (2007)
- Björkman, M. and J. Svensson (2009). "Power to the People: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment on Community-Based Monitoring in Uganda." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 124(2): 735-769.
- Thornton, R. L. (2008). "The demand for, and impact of, learning HIV status." *American Economic Review* 98(5): 1829-1863
- Cohen, Jessica and Pascaline Dupas (2010). "Free Distribution or Cost-Sharing: Evidence from Randomized Malaria Prevention Experiment," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 125(1), 1-45.
- Dupas, Pascaline (2011). "Do Teenagers Respond to HIV Risk Information? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Kenya", *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 3(1), 1-36.

#### **4.11 Gender**

- Jayachandran, S. and R. Pande (2017). "Why Are Indian Children So Short? The Role of Birth Order and Son Preference." *American Economic Review* 107(9): 2600-2629.
- Qian, N. (2008). "Missing Women and the Price of Tea in China: The Effect of Sex-Specific Earnings on Sex Imbalance." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*: 1251-1285.
- Alesina, Alberto, Paola Giuliano, and Nathan Nunn. (2013)"On the origins of gender roles: Women and the plough." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 128, no. 2: 469-530.
- Jacoby, Hanan G. and Ghazala Mansuri (2010). "Watta Satta: Bride Exchange and Women's Welfare in Rural Pakistan", *American Economic Review* 100(5): 1804-1825.

- Ambrus, Attila, Erica Field and Maximo Torero. (2010). "Muslim family law, prenuptial agreements and the emergence of dowry in Bangladesh". *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 125 (3): 1349-1397.
- Anderson, Siwan. 2007. "The Economics of Dowry and Brideprice" *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 21(4), 151-174.
- Field, Erica, and Attila Ambrus. (2008) "Early marriage, age of menarche, and female schooling attainment in Bangladesh." *Journal of political Economy* 116, no. 5: 881-930.
- Field, Erica, Seema Jayachandran, and Rohini Pande. (2010) "Do traditional institutions constrain female entrepreneurship? A field experiment on business training in India." *American Economic Review* 100, no. 2, 125-29.
- Dean, J. T., & Jayachandran, S. (2019, May). Changing Family Attitudes to Promote Female Employment. In *AEA Papers and Proceedings* (Vol. 109, pp. 138-42).
- Jensen, R. (2012). "Do labor market opportunities affect young women's work and family decisions? Experimental evidence from India." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 127: 753-792.
- Heath, R., & Mobarak, A. M. (2015). Manufacturing growth and the lives of Bangladeshi women. *Journal of Development Economics*, 115, 1-15.
- Chattopadhyay, R. and E. Duflo (2004). "Women as policy makers: Evidence from a randomized policy experiment in India." *Econometrica* 72(5): 1409-1443.
- Beaman, L., R. Chattopadhyay, E. Duflo, R. Pande and P. Topalova (2009). "Powerful Women: Does Exposure Reduce Bias?" *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 124(4): 1497-1540.
- Iyer, L., A. Mani, P. Mishra and P. Topalova (2012). "The Power of Political Voice: Women's Political Representation and Crime in India." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 4(4): 165-193.
- Jayachandran, Seema. (2015) "The roots of gender inequality in developing countries." *economics* 7, no. 1: 63-88.
- Bertrand, M., & Duflo, E. (2017). Field experiments on discrimination. In *Handbook of economic field experiments* (Vol. 1, pp. 309-393). North-Holland.
- Buvinić, M., & Furst-Nichols, R. (2014). Promoting women's economic empowerment: what works?. *The World Bank Research Observer*, 31(1), 59-101.
- Heath, R., & Jayachandran, S. (2017). The causes and consequences of increased female education and labor force participation in developing countries. In *The Oxford Handbook of Women and the Economy* (pp. 345-367). Oxford University Press.

#### 4.12 Migration

- Bardhan and Udry, chapter 5
- \* Munshi, Kaivan "Networks in the Modern Economy: Mexican Migrants in the U.S. Labor Market." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 118(2): 549-599 (2003)
- Bryan, G., Chowdhury, S., & Mobarak, A. M. (2014). Underinvestment in a profitable technology: The case of seasonal migration in Bangladesh. *Econometrica*, 82(5), 1671-1748.

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